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I. INTRODUCTION 
At issue in this appeal are the ownership rights to a walk way that runs perpendicular to 
two public streets (the "Walk Way"). The district court concluded that "ACHD has ownership of 
and jurisdiction over the walk way for the public's benefit" citing a number of provisions of the 
Idaho Code including §§ 49-117(5), 49-117(6), 40-109(5), 40-116(3), 40-310(13), 40-1310(8), 
40-1322, 40-1335, 40-1415(1), 40-1415(2), 40-2319(6), 40-1312, 14-1406, 40-1410(2), 40-
1410[ ](2), and 40-1313. None of the cited statutory provisions, nor any other statutory 
provision for that matter, authorizes ACHD to own or administer the Walk Way. 
Also at issue is the proper application of the standard for a common law public 
dedication. Without citing to or stating the well-known standard, the district court concluded that 
Darold and Minerva Smith (the "Smiths") dedicated the Walk Way to the public in connection 
with the platting of Cherry Lane Subdivision. The record, however, is devoid of any intent to 
dedicate the Walk Way to the public, let alone the "clear and unequivocal" intent that is required 
as a matter oflaw to make a dedication to the public. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Terrie Rowley ("Rowley") filed a complaint in the district court naming as defendants 
Canuta D. Boerem ("Boerem"), Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"), and the City of Boise 
("City"). Clerk's Record on Appeal, ("CR"), pp. 6-21. Through her Complaint, Rowley sought: 
(1) a determination that the Smiths dedicated the Walk Way to the public; (2) that the City took 
title of the Walk Way; (3) that there was a transfer of title from the City to ACHD; (4) that she 
has rights to the Walk Way under the common law doctrine of abutter; (5) that ACHD will at 
some time in the future abandon the Walk Way; and (6) that the doctrine of abutter and the fact 
- 1 -
that ACHD will at some point abandon the Walk Way provides her standing to seek an injunction 
requiring her neighbor Boerem to remove a shed currently on the Walk Way. !d. at 12. 
ACHD filed a motion for summary judgment on the discrete issue of whether the Smiths 
clearly and unequivocally offered the Walk Way to the public. The district court: (1) denied 
ACHD's motion on that discrete issue; (2) granted partial summary judgment to Rowley on that 
issue concluding that the Smith's dedicated the Walk Way to the public; (3) addressed the 
additional issue of whether ACHD owned the Walk Way and granted partial summary judgment 
to Rowley on that issue concluding that ACHD owned the Walk Way; and (4) certified the partial 
judgment as final pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). CR, pp. 157-81,267-69. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Rowley filed her complaint on May 9, 2012 ("Complaint"). CR, pp. 6-21. In response, 
ACHD filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, CR, pp. 28-29, ACHD's Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, CR, pp. 37-44, and the Affidavit of Scott D. Hess in Support 
of ACHD's Motion for Summary Judgment, CR, pp. 30-36. Rowley filed an Opposition to 
ACHD's Motion, CR, p. 97-109, and the Affidavit of Emily L. McClure, CR, pp. 90-96. ACHD 
filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. CR, pp. 115-121. 
The district court held a hearing on September 7,2012. 
On this record, on October 26, 2012, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision 
and Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment denying ACHD's Motion and granting, sue 
sponte, partial summary judgment in favor of Rowley. CR, pp. 157-79. On the same day, the 
district court entered a judgment entitled, "Summary Judgment re: Right-of-Way and Dedication 
Issues." CR, pp. 180-81. 
On November 13, 2012, ACHD filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative Motion 
for Rule 54(b) Certification, Motion for Permissive Appeal Under LA.R. 12 or Motion to 
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Require Joinder of Necessary Parties. CR, pp. 182-84. After briefing by the parties, on 
December 14, 2012, the district court entered an Amended Judgment and Rule 54(b) 
Certification providing: "[f]or the reasons set forth in this Court's order issued on October 26, 
2012, summary judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff Terrie H. Rowley. The summary 
judgment requested by defendant Ada County Highway District is denied." CR, pp. 267-69. 
ACHD timely filed its notice of appeal on January 25,2013. CR, pp. 289-94. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. The 1950 Plat. 
On July 14, 1950, the Smiths filed a plat for Blocks 1 and 2 and part of Block 3 of the 
Cherry Lane Subdivision as Instrument No. 304648 in Ada County ("1950 Plat"). CR, p. 34. 
The "Certificate of Owners" portion of the 1950 Plat provides in part, "[t]he owners do hereby 
dedicate to the use of the public forever all streets, not heretofore dedicated, as shown on this 
plat." Id. The Plat identified and thus dedicated to the public Taggart Street, Broxon Street, 
Shoshone Street, and Dill Drive. Id. The 1950 Plat contained cross-hatching consistent with the 
identification of public utility easements, but given the scope of the "Certificate of Owners"-
limited to "streets"-the Smith's made no public dedication of any utility easement. Id. The 
1950 Plat made no mention ofthe Walk Way. Id. 
2. The 1954 Plat and CC&R's. 
On March 22, 1954, the Smiths filed a second plat for the remaining portion of Block 3 
and for Blocks 4 and 5 of Cherry Lane Subdivision as Instrument No. 357641 in Ada County 
("1954 Plat"). CR, p. 16. The "Certificate of Owners" portion of the 1954 Plat provides in part, 
"[t]he owners do hereby dedicate to the use of the public, forever, all streets and rights of way 
easements not heretofore dedicated as shown on this plat." Id. The 1954 Plat identified and thus 
dedicated to the public Kathryn Street, and extensions of Broxon Street, Shoshone Street, and 
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Taggart Street. Id. The 1954 Plat also identified by cross-hatching public utility easements and 
thus dedicated those right-of-way easements to the pUblic. !d. The 1954 Plat identifies a "walk 
way" on a narrow portion of land running perpendicular to Dill Drive and Kathryn Street, 
through all of Block 3. The Walk Way is not identified by any cross-hatching, dotted or broken 
line, or any other markers. Id. 
Also on March 22, 1954, the Smith's recorded certain "Restrictive Covenants" in the Ada 
County Recorders Office ("1954 CC&R's"). CR, pp. 125-27. The 1954 CC&R's reserve certain 
right-of-way easements for installation and maintenance of utilities, irrigation and drainage 
facilities. Id. This is consistent with the dedication of these right-of-way easements on the face 
of the 1954 Plat. Compare CR, p. 16 with CR, pp. 125-27.1 The 1954 CC&R's make no 
reference to the Walk Way. 
3. The District Court Presumed the Smiths Dedicated the Walk Way to 
the Public. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion for Summary Judgment, the district 
court conceded that the face of the 1954 Plat did not show, on its face, a public dedication. 
Instead, it presumed that the 1954 Plat dedicated the Walk Way to the public because: 
The language "all . . . rights of way easements, not heretofore 
dedicated" would be meaningless if the grantors had not intended 
the "walk way" to be dedicated to the pUblic. The only prior 
dedications, after, all, had taken place in the 1950 plat, which 
clearly stated "[t]he owners do hereby dedicate to the use of the 
public forever all streets, not heretofore dedicated, as shown on 
this plat." Because no other possible right of way easement is 
1 The district court, on its own initiative, procured certain other "Restrictive Covenants" that it 
represents are related to the 1950 Plat. CR, pp. 128-29, 133-35. The document does not contain 
a date, a signature of either of the Smiths, or any seal or signature of a recorder. These 
"Restrictive Covenants" purport to reserve certain easements for installation and maintenance of 
utilities, irrigation and drainage facilities, but make no dedication of the right of way easements 
to the pUblic. 
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indicated in the 1954 plat, the only possible "right[] of way 
easement[] not heretofore dedicated" is the walk way. 
CR, p. 168-69. This analysis is incorrect in law and fact. It ignores the legal standard of a 
common law public dedication-requiring the plat to show a clear and unequivocal intent to 
dedicate. It also ignores the fact that the 1954 Plat shows public utility easements that were not 
previously dedicated to the public until the filing of the 1954 Plat dedicating for the first time 
"rights of way easements not heretofore dedicated as shown on this plat." CR, p. 16 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Where no provision of the Idaho Code allows ACHD to own the Walk Way that 
runs perpendicUlar to two roadways, did the district court err in concluding that ACHD owns the 
WalkWay? 
2. Where the 1954 Plat does not show a "clear and unequivocal" intent to dedicate 
the Walk Way to the public, did the district court err in presuming that the Smiths dedicated the 
Walk Way to the public? 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ACHD respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court on two independent 
bases. First, the district court erred in concluding that ACHD owns the Walk Way. As a special 
purpose district, ACHD is limited to the duties and powers provided to it by the Idaho legislature 
in statute. No provision of the Idaho Code allows ACHD to own the Walk Way which is not a 
public highway, public street, or public right-of-way, and which runs perpendicUlar to, as 
opposed to along or adjacent with, two public streets. 
Second, the district court erred in concluding that the Smiths dedicated the Walk Way 
through the doctrine of common law dedication. The threshold element for a common law 
dedication is a "clear and unequivocal" offer of the subject property to the public. While the 
1954 Plat provides broken lines to identify public streets and cross-hatchings to identify public 
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utility easements, it provides no similar markings on the Walk Way. Moreover, the dedication 
language of the 1954 Plat references "streets" and "right of way easements," but makes no 
reference to the Walk Way. And while the 1954 CC&R's reserve certain right-of-way easements 
for the installation and maintenance of utilities, irrigation, and drainage facilities, the 1954 
CC&R's are completely silent as to any reservation or dedication of the Walk Way. 
Thus, while the Smiths, through the 1954 CC&R's and the 1954 Plat, "clearly and 
unequivocally" dedicate to the public the marked streets and rights-of-way easements for the 
installation and maintenance of utilities, irrigation, and drainage facilities, they made no 
dedication of the Walk Way. 
Indeed, the district court readily admits that the 1954 Plan does not show a dedication at 
all. Instead, the court impermissibly presumes a dedication by concluding that the dedication 
language of the Plat would be "meaningless" unless the Smiths dedicated the Walk Way. This 
Court has recently rejected similar reasoning in Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,502,236 
P.3d 1257, 1262 (2010). Moreover, the district court's conclusion that the 1954 Plat would be 
"meaningless" unless the Walk Way was dedicated to the public is simply wrong. 
For these reasons, this Court should reverse and remand this matter to the district court 
with instructions to dismiss ACHD from this lawsuit. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
"On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review 
is the same as the standard used by the district court." Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 141 
Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
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matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A moving party is entitled to summary judgment when 
the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Asbury 
Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass 'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 338, 342, 271 P.3d 1194, 
1198 (2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACHD OWNS THE WALK 
WAY. 
The district court erred in concluding that "ACHD holds title to the walkway" because no 
provision of the Idaho Code authorizes ACHD to own property or an improvement to property 
that is not "roadside" or "adjacent" to a road. ACHD, as a highway district, is a special purpose 
district. See Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833, 834,663 P.2d 1135, 1137 
(Ct. App. 1983); see also Kimama Highway Dist. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 298 F. 431, 432-
33 (9th Cir. 1924). As a special purpose highway district, ACHD is not a political municipality 
and is "not created for the purpose of government." Shoshone Highway Dist. of Lincoln County 
v. Anderson, 22 Idaho 109, ---, 125 P. 219, 223 (1912). A highway district like ACHD "is created 
for a special purpose, to wit, the assessment of property within the district for the sole and only 
purpose of improving the highways within the district." Id. Because ACHD is created for a 
special purpose, its authority is limited to the powers and duties set forth in the statute. 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184, 190 (2013). It must begin with the 
literal words of the statute, Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478, 50 P.3d 488, 493 
(2002), those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must 
be construed as a whole. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). If the 
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statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. 
Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 667, 735 P.2d 974, 978 (1987). 
1. ACHD's Jurisdiction is Limited to Public Highways, Public Streets 
and Public Right-of-Ways-None of Which Include the Walk Way. 
Pursuant to Title 40, Chapters 13 and 14 of the Idaho Code, ACHD has jurisdiction over 
highways, streets, and public rights-of-way within Ada County. Idaho Code §§ 40-1310(8).2 
Idaho Code § 40-1310 describes the authority of ACHD as a highway district as: 
exclusive general supervision authority over all public highways, 
public streets, and public rights-of-way under their 
jurisdiction, with full power to establish design standards, 
establish use standards, pass resolutions and establish regulations 
in accordance with the provisions of title 49, Idaho Code, and 
control access to said public highways, public streets and public 
rights-of-way." 
Idaho Code § 40-1310(8) (emphasis added). 
ACHD does not have exclusive general supervision and authority over the Walk Way, 
because the Walk Way does not fall within the definition of "public highways", "public streets", 
or "public rights-of-ways" as defined in Idaho Code § 40-1310. 
a) The Walk Way is not a Public Highway. 
Highways are defined to include "culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways, 
roadside improvements, adjacent lands ... pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works 
or fixtures incidental to the preservation or improvement of the highways." Idaho Code § 40-
109(5). This Court has broadly interpreted the term "highway", however, the focus has been on 
whether the subject improvement was "roadside" or "adjacent" to a roadway. See, e.g., Freeman 
v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 558, 808 P.2d 1300, 1303 (1991) (citing Idaho Code § 40-109(5) and 
2 Title 40, Chapter 14 governs ACHD as it is a county-wide highway district. Idaho Code § 40-
1406, however, incorporates all of the powers and duties provided for in Title 40, Chapter 13 
into Chapter 14. 
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concluding that a runaway escape ramp was a highway because it was a "roadside improvements, 
adjacent lands or interests lawfully acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, 
works or fixtures incidental to the preservation or improvement of the highways . ... ") (emphasis 
in original). The Walk Way runs perpendicular to and between Dill Drive and Kathryn Street, 
CR p. 16, certainly not roadside or adjacent to a roadway. 
b) The Walk Way is not a Public Street. 
"Public Street" is defined as "a road, thoroughfare, alley, highway or bridge under the 
jurisdiction of a public highway agency." Idaho Code § 40-117(10). There is no indication on 
the 1954 Plat or in the 1954 CC&R's that the Walk Way is a public street. The 1954 Plat 
provides broken lines to identify public streets, and no similar marking is used to identify the 
Walk Way. See CR, p. 16. 
c) The Walk Way is not a Public Right-of-Way_ 
A public right-of-way is defined as "[1] a right-of-way open to the public and [2] under 
the jurisdiction of a public highway agency, [3] where the public highway agency has no 
obligation to construct or maintain, but may expend funds for the maintenance .... " Idaho Code 
§ 40-117(9). As to the first element, the Walk Way is not open to the public as evidenced from 
photos in the record. See CR, pp. 33, 35, 36. The second element simply begs the question 
whether a public highway agency has jurisdiction and is of no aid to the analysis. The Walk Way 
fails the third element of the definition of a "public right-of-way" because no provision of the 
Idaho Code provides a highway district like ACHD the authority to expend funds for the 
maintenance of the Walk Way. 
Contrast at least two statutes that provide ACHD authority to construct or maintain 
sidewalks. For example, Idaho Code § 40-1412 states, "A county-wide highway district may 
provide by general ordinance for the construction, repair, replacement, or removal of 
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sidewalks .... " Idaho Code § 40-1412(2). Section 40-1414 states that ACHD is "empowered to 
create local improvement districts for construction, reconstruction and maintenance of highways 
and accompanying curbs, gutters, culverts, sidewalks, paved medians, bulkheads and retaining 
walls within the boundaries of the highway districts." Idaho Code § 40-1414 (emphasis added). 
These statutes provide ACHD authority to expend funds for the maintenance of sidewalks, but 
provide no authority to expend funds for the maintenance of walk ways.3 
Idaho Code § 40-1415 confirms the same by providing county wide highway districts, 
like ACHD, the authority to design, construct, and maintain certain improvements that 
accompany right-of-ways. "County-wide highway districts organized under the provisions of 
this chapter, within the limits of any city shall be responsible for the design, construction, 
reconstruction and maintenance of city rights-of-way and accompanying curbs, gutters, culverts, 
sidewalks, paved medians, bulkheads and retaining walls." Idaho Code § 40-1415(1) (emphasis 
added). This is a very specific list. For example is provides for ''paved medians" while 
specifically reserving to the city "placement, care, and removal of trees, shrubs, grass, and other 
plants" for landscaped medians. Compare Idaho Code § 40-1415(7) with § 40-1415(1). 
"It is a universally recognized rule of construction that, where a constitution or statute 
specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others," a maxim commonly 
known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius. KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, 149 
Idaho 524, 528,236 P.3d 1284, 1288 (2010) (quoting Peck v. State, 63 Idaho 375, 380, 120 P.2d 
820, 822 (1941)). Section 40-1415 does not use "including" or some similar term to indicate 
authority to design, construct, and maintain any type of improvement beyond those listed. See 
3 Idaho Code § 40-1412 also allows a highway district to "provide by general ordinance for the 
construction, repair, replacement of removal of sidewalks which are deemed by the highway 
commissioners to be dangerous and unsafe ... " 
- 10-
id. Instead, § 40-1415 provides a specific and exhaustive list of the improvements that can be 
designed, constructed, and maintained by a single county highway district like ACHD. A walk 
way is not included in that list. 
Section 40-1415 then goes on to provide that such "design, construction, reconstruction 
and maintenance" occurs within right-of-ways and includes traffic and safety engineering, 
highway lighting, procurement, installation, operation and maintenance of traffic control devices, 
and drainage for motorist safety. Idaho Code § 40-1415(1)(a)-(d). None of these functions are 
consistent with ownership or maintenance of the Walk Way, an improvement that does not 
accompany a right-of-way, but that runs away from and perpendicular to two roadways. 
No reading of Idaho Code § 40-1310 supports the conclusion that the Walk Way is a 
"public highway", "public street", or "public right-of-way" as defined in Idaho Code § 40-1310. 
The Walk Way also does not accompany a right-of-way or exist within a right-of-way. The 
district court therefore erred in concluding that ACHD holds title to the Walk Way. 
2. The District Court Erred in Relying on Other Provisions of the Idaho 
Code to Conclude that ACHD Owns the Walk Way. 
The district court cites, partially quotes, and paraphrases a number of provisions of the 
Idaho Code including §§ 49-117(5), 49-117(6), 40-109(5), 40-116(3), 40-310(13), 40-1310(8), 
40-1322, 40-1335, 40-1415(1), 40-1415(2), 40-2319(6), 40-1312, 14-1406, 40-1410(2), 
40-141O[ ](2), and 40-1313. And with very little analysis or reasoning, and with no logical 
connection to the plain language of any of these provisions of the Code, the court states that it is 
"clear", or that ACHD "clearly" owns the Walk Way. See, e.g., CR, pp. 170-71. However, 
nothing in any of these provisions vests ACHD with the authority to own the Walk Way, and on 
this basis the district court should be reversed and ACHD should be dismissed from this lawsuit. 
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a) The District Court Erred in Relying on Title 49's Definition of 
the Word "Pedestrian" or the Phrase "Pedestrian Path" to 
Conclude that ACHD Owns the Walk Way. 
The district court acknowledges that Title 40, the Title of the Idaho Code applicable to 
ACHD, does not define "pedestrian." CR, p. 170. Thereafter, without explanation, the court 
turns to Title 49's definition of "pedestrian" and "pedestrian path." Id. But Title 49 concerns 
infractions and the regulation of motor vehicles, not jurisdictional or ownership authority of 
ACHD. See generally, Idaho Code § 49-101 et seq. 
Moreover, § 49-101 expressly limits the definitions contained in Title 49 to Title 49. See 
Idaho Code § 49-101 ("Words and phases used in this title are defined in sections 49-102 
through 49-127.") (emphasis added). Further, "it is a matter of common understanding that 
definitional provisions do not purport to prescribe what meanings shall attach to the defined 
terms for all purposes and in all contexts but generally only establish what they mean where they 
appear in that same act. Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 836, 590 P.2d 85 (1979) (citing 
Sutherland Statutory Construction. § 47.07 (4th ed. Sands rev. 1973)). 
From its identification of the word "pedestrian" and the phrase "pedestrian path" in Title 
49, the district court, without citation to any authority and without any reasoning or analysis, 
concludes that a "walk way" is manifestly a "pedestrian path." CR, p. 170. It is not surprising 
that the district court did not cite any authority, because none exists. "Walk way" is not defined 
in Title 40 or Title 49, and is only mentioned twice in the entire Idaho Code. 
The first time is in Title 56, Chapter 7, entitled "Rights of the Blind and Persons with 
Physical Disabilities." See Idaho Code § 56-702 ("The blind, the visually impaired, the hearing 
impaired, and the otherwise physically disabled have the same right as the able-bodied to the full 
and free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, public buildings, public facilities, 
and other public places."). This provision is on its face irrelevant to the ownership of the Walk 
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Way. However, consistent with § 67-6518 discussed immediately below, it is significant that § 
56-702 makes a distinction between a sidewalk and a walk way-ACHD administers sidewalks, 
cities and counties administer walk ways. 
The second time the phrase "walk way" is used in the Idaho Code is in Title 67, Chapter 
65, known as the Land Use Planning Act. See Idaho Code § 67-6518 ("Each governing board 
may adopt standards for such things as: building design; blocks, lots, and tracts of land; yards, 
courts, greenbelts, planting strips, parks, and other open spaces; trees; signs; parking spaces; 
roadways, streets, lanes, bicycleways, pedestrian walkways, rights-of-way, grades, alignments, 
and intersections; lighting; easements for public utilities; access to streams, lakes, and 
viewpoints; water systems; sewer systems; storm drainage systems; street numbers and names; 
house numbers; schools, hospitals, and other public and private development.") (emphasis 
added). Section 67-6518 is completely consistent with the limited statutory authority conferred 
uponACHD by Idaho Code §§ 40-1310(8) and 40-1415. 
The Land Use Planning Act applies only to cities and counties, and does not apply to 
highway districts. See Idaho Code § 67-6503. And § 67-6518 does not include "sidewalks", 
which by definition are ''walks'' on the side of right-of-ways, left to the jurisdiction of highway 
districts. Idaho Code §§ 40-1310(8) and 40-1415. Notably, § 67-6518 includes a number of 
improvements that run perpendicular to right-of-ways such as "greenbelts" and "pedestrian 
walkways"-improvements outside of the jurisdiction of highway districts. 
In short, the district court's reliance on the definitions of the word "pedestrian" and the 
phrase "pedestrian path" from Title 49 to conclude that ACHD owns the Walk Way is error. 
These definitions are irrelevant to whether ACHD may take title to or hold ownership in the 
WalkWay. 
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b) The District Court Erred in Relying on §§ 40-109(5), 40-116(3), 
and 40-310(13) to Conclude that ACHD Owns the Walk Way. 
With no analysis beyond a partial quotation to Idaho Code §§ 40-109(5), 40-116(3), and 
40-310(13), the district court concludes, "[t]aken together, it is clear that pedestrian facilities are 
considered an integrated portion of the highway system under Chapter 3, Title 40, of the Idaho 
Code." CR, p. 170. This unsupported statement rests solely on the ipse dixit assertion of the 
district court. When the complete text of §§ 40-109(5), 40-116(3), and 40-310(13) are 
considered, what is clear is that these statutory provisions in no way support the district court's 
conclusion that ACHD owns the Walk Way. 
Idaho Code § 40-109(5) provides: 
(5) "Highways" mean roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or 
established for the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. 
Highways shall include necessary culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, 
waterways, embankments, retaining walls, bridges, tunnels, grade 
separation structures, roadside improvements, adjacent lands or 
interests lawfully acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other 
structures, works or fixtures incidental to the preservation or 
improvement of the highways. Roads laid out and recorded as 
highways, by order of a board of commissioners, and all roads 
used as such for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have 
been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or located 
and recorded by order of a board of commissioners, are highways. 
Idaho Code § 40-116(3) provides: 
(3) "Owner" means all persons and all political subdivisions of the 
state having any title or interest in any property, rights, easements 
and interests authorized to be acquired by chapter 3, title 40, Idaho 
Code. 
Idaho Code § 40-310(13) provides that the Idaho Transportation Board shall: 
(13) Provide a right-of-way for and supervise the construction of 
side paths or sidewalks along regularly designated state highways 
outside the boundaries of incorporated cities and the expenditures 
for the construction of them may be made from the highway funds 
of the county or highway districts. 
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No reading of these sections of the Idaho Code-in part, in whole, taken together, or read 
separately-establish that the Walk Way is under ACHD's ownership or control. And certainly, 
the statutes do not make "clear" that the Walk Way is owned by ACHD. 
c) The District Court Erred in Relying on Idaho Code §§ 40-1310, 
40-1322, and 40-1335 to Conclude ACHD Owns the Walk Way. 
The district court identifies Idaho Code § 40-1310(8) as providing the powers and duties 
of the highway district commissioners. See CR, p. 171. This provision of the Code is discussed 
in Section B.1, above. The court then paraphrases Idaho Code §§ 40-1322 and 40-1335. 
Idaho Code § 40-1322 provides: 
Highway districts are empowered to create local improvement 
districts for construction, reconstruction and maintenance of 
highways and accompanying curbs, gutters, culverts, sidewalks, 
paved medians, bulkheads and retaining walls within the 
boundaries of the highway districts. The organization and 
operation of local improvement districts shall be as nearly as 
practicable as prescribed in chapter 17, title 50, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code § 40-1335 provides: 
(1) The standard for construction of curbs on each side of any city 
highway, or any connecting highway for which curbs and 
sidewalks have been prescribed by the appropriate governing body, 
shall require curb cuts or ramps at locations which allow a crossing 
movement at intersections. Each curb cut or ramp shall be 
constructed to allow reasonable access to the crosswalk for people 
with physical disabilities. 
(2) Standards set for curb cuts and ramps under this section shall 
apply to all new curb construction and to all replacement curbs 
constructed at any point in a block which gives reasonable access 
to a crosswalk. 
From these provisions,4 the district court states: "[h Jere, the walkway at issue connects 
and fronts upon two public streets. It is clearly a 'pedestrian facility,' and the ACHD clearly has 
4 In a footnote the district court also quotes portions ofIdaho Code § 40-1415 which reads: 
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the statutory authority to administer it." CR, p. 171 (emphasis added). Again, nothing in these 
provisions of the Idaho Code allow ACHD to own the Walk Way and certainly don't make 
"clear" that the Walk Way is under ACHD's ownership or control. 
d) The District Court Erred in Applying Idaho Code § 40-1312 to 
Unlawfully Expand ACHD's Limited Statutory Authority. 
As a catchall, the district court cites to Idaho Code § 40-1312 and suggests that liberal 
construction of ACHD's powers supports its conclusion. CR, pp. 171-72. The district court is 
also mistaken in this regard. 
Idaho Code § 40-1312 provides: 
The grant of powers provided in this chapter to highway districts 
and to their officers and agents, shall be liberally construed, as a 
broad and general grant of powers, to the end that the control and 
administration of the districts may be efficient. The enumeration of 
certain powers that would be implied without enumeration shall 
not be construed as a denial or exclusion of other implied powers 
(1) County-wide highway districts organized under the provisions 
of this chapter, within the limits of any city shall be responsible for 
the design, construction, reconstruction and maintenance of city 
rights-of-way and accompanying curbs, gutters, culverts, 
sidewalks, paved medians, bulkheads and retaining walls. 
(2) Acquisition and acceptance of rights-of-way shall be the 
responsibility ofthe county-wide highway district. 
In the same footnote the district court also quotes a portion of Idaho Code § 40-2319(6) 
which reads: 
(6) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit, abrogate or 
supersede the provisions of this title governing the power, 
authority or jurisdiction of a county or highway district, including 
the authority to regulate the use of highways or public rights-of-
way for pedestrian and motorist safety. 
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necessary for the free and efficient exercise of powers expressly 
granted. . 
Idaho Code § 40-1312. 
What is lacking from the district court's analysis is that liberal construction is to be 
applied only to "[t]he grant of powers provided in this chapter." Id. (emphasis added). As 
discussed in Section B.l previously, no provision of Title 40, Chapters 13 or 14, grant any power 
to ACHD or its officers or agents to control, administer, or own the Walk Way. 
C. To THE EXTENT ACHD MAY OWN THE WALK WAY, THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING ROWLEY SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE 1954 PLAT 
DOES NOT SHOW A "CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL" DEDICATION OF THE WALK 
WAY TO THE PUBLIC. 
To determine whether there was a dedication of land, the Court will interpret the plat like 
a deed, giving effect to the intent of the parties. Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Hawkes, 
138 Idaho 543, 547, 66 P.3d 798,802 (2003). The Court must first determine whether a deed is 
ambiguous, which is a question of law. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ethington Family Trust, 137 Idaho 
435, 438, 50 P.3d 450, 453 (2002). "An instrument is ambiguous if it is subject to conflicting 
interpretations." Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County, 152 Idaho 207, 212, 268 P.3d 1159, 1164 
(2012). 
"An ambiguous plat ... equivocates as to whether the owner intended to dedicate the 
land." Id. at 211, 268 P.3d at 1163. Since "unequivocal" and "ambiguous" are antonyms, no 
reasonable person could conclude that an ambiguous plat reflects an unequivocal intent. See 
Asbury Park, LLC, 152 Idaho at 344, 271 P.3d at 1200 (citing Molyneux v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 
54 Idaho 619, 632, 35 P.2d 651, 656 (1934) (noting that the dictionary definition of 
"unequivocal" included the meaning "not ambiguous"). Said another way, "[t]he intent of the 
owner to dedicate his land to public use must be clearly and unequivocally shown and must 
never be presumed." Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,502,236 P.3d 1257, 1262 (2010). 
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1. The District Court Did Not Cite or Apply the Proper Standard. 
A public dedication of property by common law requires that the owner "clearly and 
unequivocally" intend to dedicate the land to public use. See Asbury Park, LLC, 152 Idaho at 
338,271 P.3d at 1200 (affilTI1ing summary judgment where plaintiff did not establish a clear and 
unequivocal offer of dedication); Saddlehorn Ranch Landowner S, Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 
752,203 P.3d 677, 682 (2009) ("The intent of the owner to dedicate his land to public use must 
be clearly and unequivocally shown and must never be presumed.,,).5 
This element of a common law dedication was first articulated by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in Pullin v. Victor, 103 -Idaho 879, 655 P.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1982) ("an offer by the owner, 
clearly and unequivocally indicated by his words or acts evidencing his intention to dedicate the 
land to a public use"). This Court thereafter specifically adopted the "clear and unequivocal" 
intent element in Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club of Coeur D 'Alene, Ltd., 116 Idaho 219, 
224, 775 P.2d 111, 116 (1989). Since Worley, this Court has stated the same "clear and 
unequivocal" element in more than ten decisions. See, e.g., Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 
205, 998 P.2d 1118 (2000); Farrell v. Board of Com 'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.2d 
304 (2002); Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Hawkes, 138 Idaho 543, 66 P.3d 798 (2003); 
Ponderosa Home Site Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc., 139 Idaho 699, 85 P.3d 675 
(2004); West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 106 P.3d 401 (2005); Armand v. 
Opportunity Management Co., Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 117 P.3d 123 (2005); Ponderosa Homesite 
Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc., 143 Idaho 407, 146 P.3d 673 (2006); Saddlehorn Ranch 
Landowner S, Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 203 P.3d 677 (2009); Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 
282, 246 P.3d 391 (2010); Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass 'n, Inc., 152 
5 No statutory dedication of the Walk Way under Idaho Code § 50-1309 was accomplished in 
this case, because even a statutory dedication to the public "requires a plat that unequivocally 
dedicates [land] to public use." Lattin, 149 Idaho at 500, 236 P.3d at 1261. 
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Idaho 338, 271 P.3d 1194 (2012); Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County, 152 Idaho 207, 268 P.3d 
1159 (2012); Paddison Scenic Properties, Family Trust, L.e. v. Idaho County, 153 Idaho 1, 278 
P.3d 403 (2012). 
It is significant that the district court did not recite this well-know standard, but it is more 
significant that the district court did not apply this standard. Instead, the district court cited East 
Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679, 837 P.2d 805 (1992) and Coward v. Hadley, 
150 Idaho 282, 286-87, 246 P.3d 391, 395-96 (2011). CR, pp. 168-69. Neither case involves a 
public dedication. 
East Lizard was an adverse possession case not a public dedication case. In that case this 
Court did not set forth or apply the common law public dedication standard which includes the 
element of clear and unequivocal intent. Although analyzing a different issue altogether, East 
Lizard supports the conclusion that the Walk Way was not dedicated to the public because in that 
case, like in this case, the plat simply does not indicate that the subject property was dedicated 
for public use. See 122 Idaho 679, 682, 837 P.2d 805, 808. 
The district court's reliance on Coward is equally misplaced. Coward is an easement 
case, not a public dedication case. There the Court held that a 1922 deed conveying an easement 
in favor of two lots "for the purpose of an alley" did not create an implied easement in favor of 
the Cowards. 150 Idaho 282, 287, 246 P.3d 391, 396. Although the Cowards analogized to the 
doctrine of public dedication for their theory of "implied easement," this Court made no effort to 
analyze or apply the common law dedication standard, including the element of clear and 
unequivocal intent. Moreover, similar to East Lizard, if Coward is at all relevant to this case, it 
supports the conclusion that the Smith's did not dedicate the Walk Way to the public. The 1922 
deed in Coward did not clearly and unequivocally dedicate the alley to the public much like the 
1954 Plat does not clearly unequivocally dedicate the Walk Way to the pUblic. 
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2. The District Court Impermissibly Presumes a Public Dedication. 
Aside from the inapplicability of the authority it cites, and regardless of the standard that 
it applied, the district court impermissibly presumed that the Smiths intended to dedicate the 
WalkWay. 
While the 1954 Plat does state, "[t]he owners do hereby dedicate to the use of the public, 
forever, all streets and rights of way easements, not heretofore dedicated as shown on this plat," 
nothing on the 1954 Plat provides that the Walk Way is a "street" or "right of way easement" as 
referenced in the dedication language. The district court attempts to work around this fact by 
presuming that "[t]he language 'all ... rights of way easements, not heretofore dedicated' would 
be meaningless if the grantors had not intended the 'walk way' to be dedicated to the public." 
CR, p. 168. The court makes this presumption based on its understanding that, "no other 
possible right of way easement is indicated in the 1954 plat." Id. 
This Court has previously rejected this same argument. See Lattin, 149 Idaho at 502, 236 
P.3d at 1262. In that case, Adams County, urging that a certain portion of land marked on a plat 
was dedicated to the public, argued that the subject parcel must have been dedicated to the public 
because the dedication language on the plat otherwise would have been meaningless. Id. This 
Court said, "[t]he County's interpretation is unreasonable." Id. The Court reasoned, "[t]he intent 
of the owner to dedicate his land to public use must be clearly and unequivocally shown and 
must never be presumed." Id. (emphasis added). Here, the district court concluded that Walk 
Way was dedicated to the public, not because it was clearly and unequivocally shown on the 
1954 Plat, but because the court impermissibly presumed it so. This is reversible error. Lattin, 
149 Idaho at 502,236 P.3d at 1262. 
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3. The District Court's Reading of the 1954 Plat is Simply Wrong. 
The district court's conclusion that the dedication language on the 1954 Plat would be 
"meaningless" unless the Smiths intended it to reference the Walk Way is simply incorrect. The 
word "heretofore" means formerly or previously. The 1954 Plat shows public utility easements 
both on the drawing portion of the 1954 Plat and in the legend on the lower right comer. See 
CR., p. 16. The Smiths had not previously dedicated those public utility easements to the public. 
Additionally, the 1954 Plat shows cross-hatching between Lots 21 and 22 further identifying 
some form of easement or right of way that the Smiths had not previously dedicated to the 
public. See id.; Kepler-Fleenor, 152 Idaho at 212, 268 P.3d at 1164 ("cross-hatching ... 
typically denotes an easement"). 
Moreover, the 1950 Plat shows cross-hatching consistent with public utility easements on 
Blocks 1, 2, and 3. See CR, p. 34; Kepler-Fleenor, 152 Idaho at 212, 268 P.3d at 1164. The 
Smiths had not previously dedicated those presumed public utility easements to the public 
because the only dedication language on the 1950 Plat reads "[t]he owners do hereby dedicate to 
the use of the public forever all streets, not heretofore dedicate, as shown on this plat." See CR, 
p. 34. Without the dedication language "rights of way easements, not heretofore dedicated" as it 
appears on the 1954 Plat, there would be no public dedication of those public utility easements. 
The district court's conclusion that the dedication language on the 1954 Plat would be 
"meaningless" unless it referred to the Walk Way is simply wrong. As best, the intent of the 
Smiths is ambiguous. And as this Court recently held, "[a]n ambiguous plat ... equivocates as 
to whether the owner intended to dedicate the land." Kepler-Fleenor, 152 Idaho at 211, 268 P.3d 
at 1163. Because the 1954 Plat is at best ambiguous, it cannot be clear and unequivocal and 
Rowley cannot prove an essential element of a public dedication. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
ACHD respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court on two independent 
bases. First, as a special purpose district, ACHD is limited to the duties and powers provided to 
it by the legislature. No provision of the Idaho Code allows ACHD to own the Walk Way which 
runs away from and perpendicular to, as opposed to adjacent with, a roadway. Second, the 1954 
Plat does not establish a clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the Walk Way to pUblic. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the Smiths did not make a common law dedication to the public. 
For these reasons, the Court should reverse and remand this matter to the district court 
with instructions to dismiss ACHD from the lawsuit. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2013. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
By 
Scott D. Hess, of the firm 
A. Dean Bennett, of the firm 
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